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Summary of the project and its objectives
The UK is in a critical juncture with regard to the process of negotiations to leave the European 
Union. Important discussions are taking place which will shape the future relation between 
Britain and the EU. The economic analyses published on the issue have, so far, largely failed to 
grasp the attention of the general public. Most of the discussions about Brexit have focused 
at a national level and there has been very little evidence-based discussion at a local level. 
This project aims at stimulating a reflexive participatory research process involving citizens, 
policy-makers, business people and civil-society representatives. It introduces an innovative 
methodology that contextualises quantitative data through expert interviews and the analysis 
of local sources. The reports and discussion panels organised within the framework of the 
project seek to increase our understanding about the impact of Brexit at a local level.
Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level 
Pendle case study
This report contributes to the broader research project co-ordinated 
by the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE).
This study focuses on the perceived impact of Brexit on British local authorities. Five local 
authority case studies have been selected: Mansfield, Pendle, Ceredigion, Southampton and 
Barnet. As the aim of the broader study is to understand the impact of Brexit at the local level, 
this report is informed chiefly by the qualitative interviews, while the interviews themselves were 
conditioned by the quantitative impact assessments (see Appendix on page 14) that rely on 
nation-wide economic data.
PENDLE
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Pendle is a relatively small local authority. Its economy is 
reliant on manufacturing with a particular specialisation 
in aerospace manufacturing. Pendle’s work area is 
strongly associated with neighbouring Burnley and there 
has been a recent proliferation of low-skilled, precarious 
employment in both Burnley and Pendle. 
Pendle conforms with the general ‘left behind’ analysis 
that has dominated analyses of the Brexit vote. Despite 
having a below average level of residents born in European 
Union countries, the primary reason Pendle residents 
voted heavily in favour of Leave at the 2016 referendum 
was immigration. To some extent this can be related to the 
lack of integration with the sizeable Asian minority. But 
it is also related to perceptions that the small number of 
immigrants from EU countries has driven wages down. 
The primary problems confronting Pendle’s economy are 
skills shortages and declining investment. These problems 
are related to the changing economic climate in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis. However Britain’s withdrawal 
from the EU is unlikely to provide a more favourable 
climate in which these issues can be improved. 
Leaving the  EU could further depreciate levels of 
investment. Manufacturing firms in the aerospace 
industry have extensive and complex supply chains. 
Even the softest form of Brexit is likely to restrict in some 
way the free movement of capital and the imposition of 
import and export duties would affect supply chains and 
manufacturing costs. 
Pendle’s low level of EU immigration means that the 
restriction on the movement of labour will not have a 
widespread impact on the area. However immigration has 
proved an important means of soft skill share in the past. 
The decline in access to European universities may also 
lead to a decline in business access to new technologies. 
There is widespread concern regarding the lack of 
clarity and uncertainty concerning the specific terms of 
EU exit. This has contributed to a low-growth business 
environment. There is concern as to whether the 
government will replace any funding losses created by a 
lack of access to European structural funds. 
Executive summary
And everyday these projections appear to change. Yet little 
attention has been paid to how Brexit has already politically 
and economically impacted Britain at the local level. Nor has 
there been much attention given to projections of how Brexit’s 
impacts are understood and interpreted at the local level. 
This report bridges this gap. It provides an overview of the 
projected economic effects of Brexit on the local authority 
of Pendle. After providing a contextual overview of Pendle, 
the report outlines the ways in which Brexit is likely to impact 
Pendle’s economy and what Brexit means in terms of policies 
for local economic development.
This report draws on a wide range of sources. Through desk 
research, local reports were sourced from the borough and 
county councils, the Lancashire Enterprise Partnership and 
other local organisations. These provide insights into the 
primary economic challenges that Pendle faces, alongside 
the local area’s approach to economic planning. This was 
supplemented through interviews with local stakeholders, 
including councillors, business people and others employed 
in local organisations. Through this research, a picture of 
how Brexit is expected to impact Pendle was formed, and 
throughout the report this is compared with more general 
academic projections. 
Overall, this report shows a mixed picture for Pendle. As an 
area with high manufacturing, Brexit is likely to present Pendle 
with significant difficulties. Particularly in the short term, the 
impact on supply chains for large companies could result in 
economic downturn. However, the low number of immigrants 
from EU states and the relatively contained nature of Pendle’s 
economy mean the long-term impact of Brexit may be less 
painful than for other areas of Britain, in particular around 
regulations and procurement.
Introduction
On 29 March 2017 Theresa May invoked Article 50, thereby officially beginning 
the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. Since this date, there 
have been almost daily newspaper reports and updates on what Brexit will mean 
for the UK.
Image 1: Salterforth village in the borough of Pendle
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Image 2: A row of unoccupied houses (Lancashire Evening Post)
These include the combination of Pendle’s high manufacturing 
base, relatively high Leave vote at the 2016 referendum and its 
status as a marginal parliamentary constituency as a result of a 
significant swing to Labour in 2017.
Pendle’s population is 90,600, which makes it a small local 
authority area relative to other authorities in Lancashire. Its 
population is split across a number of small towns. Nelson 
is the largest with a population of 29,135 while Colne, 18,806, 
and Barnoldswick, 10,752, are the other major centres. 
These relatively small centres reflect Pendle’s relatively low 
population density when compared to Lancashire and the 
national average.
These town centres developed in the 19th century as mill 
towns. Indeed, Pendle’s economic development was closely 
tied to its geographical location between Liverpool and Leeds, 
making it an ideal location as a cotton-weaving district.1 Today, 
mills continue to dot the region’s landscape; however the mill 
economy has largely been replaced by manufacturing. The 
importance of manufacturing, relative to other industries, is 
shown in the graph in Figure 1. Pendle’s manufacturing base 
forms 28.1% of total employment in the local authority area, 
which is three times the national average (9.2%).2 
Pendle’s manufacturing enjoys a particular specialisation 
in the aerospace sector. Major aerospace manufacturers in 
Pendle include Rolls Royce, in Barnoldswick, Merc Engineering, 
in Barrowford, and Euravia, in Kelbrook. At the same time, it 
1 See Taylor S. 2000. Pendle Textile Mills: The Buildings of the Textile Industry in the Borough of Pendle, Lancashire. English Heritage. Available  at: https://www.pendle.
gov.uk/download/downloads/id/.../pendle_textile_mills_study.pdf. 
2 Lancashire Enterprise Partnership. 2018. The Burnley and Pendle Labour Market Intelligence Report. Available at:  https://www.lancashireskillshub.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2018/04/Burnley-and-Pendle-TTWA-report.pdf.  
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.  
5 Interview with Gordon Lishman, Liberal Democrat candidate at the 2017 General Election, 31 May 2018. 
6 Interviews with Dennis Mendoros, Chair of Pendle Vision Board, 30 May 2018, and Joe Cooney, Conservative Councillor on Pendle Borough Council and Lancashire 
County Council, 1 June 2018. 
7 Sanders M. 2018. ‘Undercover: Britain’s Cheap Clothes: Channel 4 Dispatches’. Channel 4. 30 January. Available at: http://www.channel4.com/info/press/news/
undercover-britains-cheap-clothes-channel-4-dispatches-mon-30th-jan.  
8 The figures in this paragraph are taken from Pendle Borough Council. 2015. Pendle Profile 2015. Available at: https://www.pendle.gov.uk/downloads/file/8643/
pendle_profile_2015. 
is important to note that Pendle’s economy is predominantly 
comprised of Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs), as 90% of 
Pendle’s businesses employ less than 20 people.3 The strong 
manufacturing base makes Pendle an important case study, 
given that projections tend to show manufacturing economies 
to be some of the hardest hit by a potential Brexit. 
Also worth noting with regards to Pendle’s local economy is its 
close affinity with neighbouring Burnley. Many Pendle residents 
will work in Burnley;4 however in interviews, it was suggested 
that they are unlikely to work elsewhere in Lancashire.5
This is largely due to the poor transport links outside of the 
M65.6 Within this context, there has been a growth in low-
skilled employment in Burnley and Pendle. Two of the biggest 
low-skilled employers are the distribution centre for the 
global fashion brand Boohoo, in Burnley, and the call-centre 
headquarters for the telecommunications firm Daisy Group, in 
Pendle. Employment in these fields tends to be precarious, with 
a Channel 4 exposé of Boohoo’s employment practices finding 
that the company was underpaying workers and exposing them 
to unsafe and dehumanising work practices.7 
One issue confronting Pendle is that it suffers from relative 
deprivation.8 Based on average IMD Scores, which combine 
deprivations in terms of income, employment, education, health, 
crime, housing and living environment, Pendle is ranked 38th 
out of 326 in terms of deprivation. These areas can be explored 
in greater depth. In terms of housing, in Pendle house prices 
Background of Pendle 
This section provides contextual information on Pendle. In doing so, it outlines 
some of the reasons Pendle was selected as a case study within the broader 
aims of the research project.
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are nearly half the national average, 62% of households are in 
Council Tax Band A (compared to 25% nationally) and Pendle 
has doubled the number of houses without central heating 
compared to national averages and averages in Lancashire. In 
terms of health, life expectancy is below the national average 
by 1.5 years and 1.3 years for males and females respectively. 
Pendle also has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the 
country, whilst also suffering an above average obesity rate. 
The graph in Figure 2, above, shows that Pendle has a sizeable 
ethnic community (for more figures see Appendix on page 14). 
The vast majority of the non-white ethnic minority is Asian 
9 Pendle Borough Council. 2009. Area Profile for Nelson. Available at: https://www.pendle.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/6582/area_profile_for_nelson.pdf.  
10 Interview with Tony Greaves, Member of House of Lords and Liberal Democrat councillor on Pendle Borough Council, 25 May 2018.  See also Engel M. 2017. 
The fish-eaters and the fasters. New Statesman. 22 May. Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/05/fish-eaters-and-fasters. 
11 Data on Pendle population rely on Office of National Statistics Population Estimates. The most recent estimate is from mid-2016. See: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/datasets/localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See for instance: Bruter M. and Harrison S.L. 2016. The impact of Brexit on consumer behaviour. Opinium Research. Available at: http://opinium.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/08/the_impact_of_brexit_on_consumer_behaviour_0.pdf. 
and is largely concentrated in 
Nelson, where the non-white 
population is 29.2% compared 
to 13.4% in the rest of Pendle.9 
While this dynamic is not unusual, 
ethnic tensions in the region are very 
high. In 2001, there were a series of 
race riots in neighbouring Burnley, described 
locally as ‘the disturbances’. Interviews with local councillors 
across the party spectrum and with local journalists suggest 
these divides similarly exist in Pendle, and while they have not 
culminated in violence, they have continued to simmer since 
‘the disturbances’.10 
This community developed in the 1950s and 1960s, when 
post-Second World War labour shortages produced high 
demand for workers in Pendle’s mills. Immigration, from all 
sources, to Pendle is quite low. Office of National Statistics 
figures state that 89% of residents were born in the United 
Kingdom.11 In terms of immigration from the EU, 2.3% of 
Pendle residents were born in other EU countries.12 This is 
1.4% below the national average. Hence, while Pendle does 
not face high immigration, several academic accounts of 
the Brexit vote found that areas like this do tend to have high 
immigration concerns which translated into high support for 
leaving the EU.13 
28.1%
Total employment
in the local authority area 
from manufacturing
Figure 1:  Employment share in key industries for Pendle, 1982 to 2016.
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Figure 2: Pendle population by ethnicity, 2016
 White UK born 80%
 White not UK born 5%
 Ethnic minority UK born 6%
 Ethnic minority not UK born 9%
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This makes Pendle an important case to explore as divides 
over immigration have filtered through into local politics. Pendle 
was the last holdout of the British National Party (BNP), as 
Brian Parker was the last BNP councillor in the country when he 
retired before the 2018 local elections.14 More broadly, politics 
in Pendle was described as ‘poisonous and tribal’.15 Over the 
course of preliminary research for this report, Pendle council 
changed from a Labour and Liberal Democratic coalition to a 
Conservative majority of one. The 2018 local 
elections made national news, as the 
Conservative’s majority includes a 
councillor who before the elections 
had been suspended from the party 
and was forced to contest the 
election as an independent due to 
a racist joke shared on their social 
media account.16
14 Pidd H. 2018. As the BNP vanishes, do the forces that built it remain? The Guardian. 2 May. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/02/bnps-
last-district-councillor-bows-out-but-insists-party-will-rise-again. 
15 Interview with Dominic Collis, journalist at the Burnley Express, 30 May 2018. 
16 See BBC. 2018. Tories urged to act in ‘racist joke’ row at Pendle Council. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44022663. 
In terms of national-level politics, Pendle is interesting 
for several reasons. Its vote in favour was Leave sits well 
above the national and regional average. At the 2016 Brexit 
referendum the Leave vote in Pendle was 63.15%. This is close 
to 12% above the national average, and roughly 10% above the 
regional average of 53.65% in the North West. The seat swung 
from Labour to the Conservatives at the 2010 General Election. 
Significantly, at the 2017 General Election, Labour’s Wayne 
Blackburn enjoyed an 11.2% swing. This saw the majority of 
the incumbent Conservative MP, Andrew Stephenson, decrease 
from 12.8% to 2.8%. In the context of the 2016 referendum 
result, the electoral dynamics in Pendle are interesting as it 
represents a high Leave-voting seat that subsequently moved 
from a safe Conservative seat to a marginal Conservative one 
in between the 2015 and 2017 General Elections.
The 2016 Brexit referendum 
Leave vote in Pendle was 
63.15% 
Image 3: Victoria Mill, Burnley, Lancashire
Image 4: Burnley and Pendle bus
Working in precarious manufacturing and low-skilled jobs, 
these relatively deprived voters feel threatened by immigration 
and were motivated by the belief that no one listens to their 
concerns.17 Often described as the ‘cul-de-sac’ of Lancashire, 
Pendle’s strong manufacturing economy, relatively deprived 
population and ethnic tensions appear on face value to fit the 
description of a ‘left behind’ community. This sections finds 
that immigration and a feeling of political disconnect were 
the primary vote drivers in Pendle. However, it also notes that 
the non-existence of any local Remain campaign may have 
exacerbated the extent of the Leave vote. 
The most obvious driver of the Brexit vote in Pendle was 
immigration. Academic analysis has shown the Leave 
campaign’s clear anti-immigration rhetoric was the most 
important argument they had in influencing voters.18 Indeed, 
the key projected benefits of leaving the EU for pro-Brexit voters 
were limiting immigration and reducing the risk of terrorism. 
While these sentiments were clearly felt in Pendle, this is curious 
as immigration from EU countries is low. Despite this, Councillor 
Joe Cooney argues that immigration from Eastern Europe has 
become more visible only recently with a ‘proliferation of Eastern 
European shops’. But moreover, Cooney said that ‘what people 
have told me is that they’ve kept the wages lower because 
they’re prepared to work for a below living wage.’ However, it was 
generally agreed by other interviewees that strong sentiments 
about Eastern European migrants are influenced by views about 
the Asian community.19 One Labour councillor, Wayne Blackburn, 
17 Curtice J. 2017. Why Leave won the UK’s EU referendum. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol 55 no S1. 
18 Bruther and Harrison 2016; Curtice 2017.
19 Interviews with Wayne Blackburn, Labour Councillor on Pendle Borough Council, 30 May 2018; Tony Greaves, 25 May 2018; Gordon Lishman, 31 May 2018; and 
Dominic Collis, 30 May 2018. 
20 Interview with Wayne Blackburn, 30 May 2018.
21 Swales K. 2016. Understanding the Leave vote. Natcen Social Research; Goodwin M. 2018. ‘The perceived costs and benefits of Brexit’. In The UK in a Changing Europe 
(Ed.). Brexit and Public Opinion, pp. 24-27.  
22 Interview with Joe Cooney, 1 June 2018.
23 Interview with Gordon Lishman, 31 May 2018.
24 Ibid.
25 Breinlich H., Dhingra S., Sampson T., and Van Reenan J. 2016. Who Bears the Pain? How the costs of Brexit would be distributed across income groups. CEP Brexit 
Series: Paper No. 7. Available at: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit07.pdf. 
26 Clarke J. and Newman J. 2017. People in this country have had enough of experts: Brexit and the paradoxes of populism. Critical Policy Studies, Vol 11, 1, pp 101-116. 
said that people tended to believe the Asian community is bigger 
than it is, and that the problems of integration that reared up in 
the 2000s are still felt in the community today.20 Interviewees 
tended to agree that Leave voters were aware that leaving the 
European Union would not change their relationship with the 
Asian community. However, the conflation of the two fits with 
broader understanding that immigration as an issue is often 
conflated with  broader issues of  identity.21  
The other facet of this identity was a strong parochial pull within 
Pendle. Cooney reiterated that there is a strong local loyalty 
to the town, where residents of Colne feel that their interests 
are often overlooked by the larger Nelson.22 Building on this 
sentiment, Gordon Lishman, the Liberal Democrat candidate at 
the 2017 General Election, argued that ‘people take pride in their 
work and feel that they have a long term commitment to their 
employer. They feel that this is reciprocated.’23 But Lishman also 
noted that manufacturing had slowly declined and the creeping 
rise of short-term employment in call centres, like Daisy Group, 
had fostered a growing insecurity. Lishman later noted that 
this manifested in a lack of aspiration, ‘the pervasive belief that 
there’s no point.’24 This parochial sentiment thus can be linked 
with the ‘anti-politics’ that academic accounts have found to 
exist more broadly. For instance, a study at the LSE Centre for 
Economic Performance (CEP) notes  the popular view that EU 
membership only benefits elites,25 while Clarke and Newman 
note the Leave movement’s anti-expertise sentiments were often 
expressed in terms where experts were equated with elites.26 
Explaining the Brexit vote in Pendle
Academic and media accounts of the Brexit vote have often focused on 
the ‘left behind’
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In Pendle it is clear that voters feel the growing deprivation is a 
result of top-down decision making. The Brexit vote was treated 
as an opportunity to express the parochial sentiment that the 
area is capable of looking out for itself. 
This sense of identity was clearly a major driver. It was so strong 
that there was a clear consensus across the interviews from all 
political persuasions that if there was a second referendum held 
today, Pendle’s vote would be the same or even more strongly 
Leave. But what also came out of these interviews was a general 
sense that there was a lack of information supplied by the Leave 
campaign about what Brexit would actually mean for the area. 
And significantly, it was agreed that the Remain campaign was 
‘virtually non-existent’.27 For instance, Lishman argued that ‘the 
opportunities to campaign, particularly in relation to engineering 
exports, was simply not brought out. People in aerospace in 
particular, are strongly linked to BA and the European airbus, 
heard no argument about those things.’28 Lishman continued 
that there is a sizeable population of professionals who may 
have been more inclined to support Remain if they had been 
presented with this sort of information. This sentiment was 
shared by most interviewees. While they agreed that this would 
not have swung the election, it is certainly plausible that the 
margin of the result in Pendle may have been slightly closer. 
27 Interview with Joe Cooney, 1 June 2018. 
28 Interview with Gordon Lishman, 31 May 2018. 
‘...if there was a second referendum held 
today, Pendle’s vote would be the same or 
even more strongly Leave.’
Image 5: Welcome to Laneshawbridge, Pendle, road-side sign
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As has been touched on in previous sections, Pendle has a 
low number of migrants from EU countries. Furthermore, 
local businesses have not reported to the council or to local 
development boards strong concerns over loss of demand in 
terms of trade within the EU.29
This is not to say that Pendle is bereft of economic problems. 
It appears that a lack of access to financing and a skills 
shortage are the two major problems facing the region. These 
issues were acknowledged in almost every interview, with 
particular emphasis placed on the latter. There was not the 
same consensus as to the causes of thi s shortage. Pendle has 
a below average number of graduates with Level 4 or above 
skills qualifications.30 When questioned as to why this skills gap 
existed, 28% of businesses in Burnley and Pendle stated that 
workers had not received appropriate training, while 24% said 
that employees lacked the required motivation to learn.31 
On the one hand, some local stakeholders argued that the 
austerity policies of the last decade had created a clear decline in 
the funding of key services in education and health. Cuts to the 
national apprenticeship programme were cited by Councillors 
Blackburn and Greaves. Meanwhile, for Neil McInroy of the 
Centre for Local Economic Strategies, austerity had created 
a ‘poverty premium’ in which young people in underfunded 
communities like Pendle lacked aspiration as they could 
not see a viable economic future under current economic 
circumstances.32 Others have linked these problems to transport 
difficulties. Several interviewees described Pendle as a cul-de-
sac where a lack of investment is tied to poor transport links.33 
The reported skills shortages are tied to an inability to retain 
29 Interview with Gordon Lishman, 31 May 2018. 
30 Lancashire Enterprise Partnership. 2018. The Burnley and Pendle Labour Market Intelligence Report.
31 Ibid.  
32 Interview with Neil McInroy, CEO Centre for Local Economic Strategy, 18 May 2018.  
33 Interview with Dennis Mendoros, 30 May 2018; Interview with Joe Cooney, 1 June 2018.
34 Pennine Lancashire. 2016. Growth and Prosperity Plan. Available at: https://www.burnley.gov.uk/sites/default/files/RPP_Pennine%20Lancashire%20Growth%20%20
Prosperity%202016-32.pdf
35 Chen W., Los B., McCann P., Ortega-Argiles R., Thissen M. and van Oort F. 2018. The Continental Divide? Economic Exposure to Brexit in Regions and Countries on both 
sides of the Channel. Papers in Regional Science, Vol 97, 1, pp 25-54. 
36 Ibid.
high-quality workers due to 
housing shortages. The lack of 
adequate transport and housing 
is a problem also outlined in 
the local authorities’ economic 
development strategy.34
While these problems are clearly 
the most pertinent for Pendle, it 
is also apparent that in the short 
term the uncertainty created by 
leaving the EUis unlikely to resolve the longstanding problems 
associated with a lack of financing and skills shortages. 
Uncertainty for Pendle’s 
manufacturing sector 
While Britain has a low manufacturing base, academic accounts 
maintain that areas reliant on manufacturing will be some 
of the hardest hit by the UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union. In particular this will come as a result of negative trade 
consequences. An LSE CEP report measures trade effects 
through analysis of the share of regional GDP that is contained 
in trade flows between EU exporters and UK importers.35 They 
find that UK regions are generally more exposed than EU27 
counterparts. Moreover Lancashire is particularly exposed. 
The aforementioned report finds that 14-16% of its GDP can be 
affected by Brexit, with 39% of Lancashire’s manufacturing base 
exposed to the trade effects of withdrawal.36 This conforms 
with industry expectations, as 70% of members of the Society 
Members of the Society of 
Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders who expect Brexit 
to have a negative impact 
on their businesses
70%
Brexit effect
Pendle is an interesting case study in that while it voted strongly to Leave, as a 
community it does not seem to have much reliance on the EU.
11
of Motor Manufacturers and Traders expect Brexit to have a 
negative impact on their businesses.37 
It is unclear to what extent Pendle will be impacted in this way. 
While it has a strong reliance on manufacturing, it specialises 
in the aerospace sector. Dennis Mendoros, former CEO of 
Euravia and the current chair of the Pendle Vision Board, says 
that compared to other aerospace industries, as in France, 
British aerospace is robust and has traditionally been more 
independent of government support.38 The largest export 
market for the region is the USA, while China and the Middle 
East are also significant markets for Pendle’s manufacturing 
sector.39 Trade in these markets already operates under World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, so on face value Brexit should 
not create added difficulties. Councillor Cooney, who holds 
the Finance portfolio on Pendle Borough Council and is also 
a member of Lancashire County Council, says that only one 
major local engineering firm has expressed concerns due to a 
reliance on trade within the EU.40 Miranda Barker, the CEO of the 
East Lancashire Chamber of Commerce, reported that on the 
whole, local export manufacturing businesses are adaptable 
and are prepared for Brexit; however, they are waiting to see 
exactly what Brexit looks like.41
However, even for these firms, the impact Brexit could have 
on supply chains must be of some concern. For over 20 years 
UK trade with the EUhas been based on the free movement 
of capital, labour, goods and services across their borders. 
Depending on the nature of the Brexit deal, these agreements 
are likely to be more difficult, which will create problems 
for business supply chains. In the aerospace sector, one 
component may be manufactured in France, and the end 
product may need to cross the UK-EU border several times 
before completion. Several business reports indicate that 
even under the softest possible Brexit in which the UK keeps 
almost all of its access to the single market, there are still likely 
to be limits on the free movement of labour, which will create 
employment issues.42 Any legislative change could increase 
taxes, create costs around import and export duties and lead to 
a rise in logistical lead time frames.43
37 Dhingraet al. 2017.  The Local Economic Effects of Brexit. CEP Brexit Series: Paper no 10. Available at: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit10.pdf. 
38 Interview with Dennis Mendoros, 30 May 2018. 
39 Interview with Miranda Barker, CEO East Lancashire Chamber of Commerce, 28 June 2018.
40 Interview with Joe Cooney, 1 June 2018.
41 Interview with Miranda Barker, 28 June 2018.
42 PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2017. Supply Chain: Your Brexit Comparative Advantage. PWC Report. February. Available at: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/assets/
brexit-supply-chain-paper.pdf.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Odell M. 2018. Airbus Brexit warning alarms long supply chain. Financial Times. 22 June. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/e4109788-7635-11e8-b326-
75a27d27ea5f. 
45 Airbus. 2018. Airbus provides update on impact of Brexit No Deal/Deal scenarios. Airbus. 21 June. Available at: https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/
en/2018/06/airbus-provides-update-on-impact-of-brexit-no-deal-deal-scenario.html. 
In a high-profile statement, Airbus recently announced that it 
may move its entire UK operations offshore. Airbus cited the 
potential to lose up to €1bn a week if there is no frictionless trade 
agreement.44 In their statement, Airbus said that ‘the current 
planned transition is too short for the EU and UK government 
to agree the outstanding issues, and too short for Airbus to 
implement the required changes with its extensive supply 
chain.’45 While Airbus does not operate in Pendle, this is reflective 
of thinking within the aerospace industry. Rolls Royce, whose 
hydraulic engine factory in Barnoldswick is one of Pendle’s 
biggest employers, has reportedly considered a move to the 
Rolls Royce to cut
162
jobs from the 
Barnoldswick 
factory
Image 6: Immigration is an important source 
of skills-sharing in the aerospace sector
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European continent depending on the final Brexit deal.46 And 
after citing the pound’s post-Brexit plunge as a contributing 
factor to its £4.64 bn 2017 loss,47 in April 2018 Rolls Royce 
announced that it would cut 162 jobs from the Barnoldswick 
factory.48 While it is unclear if this decision was directly related to 
Brexit, it does reflect the prevailing economic climate where the 
potential impact leaving the EU will have on supply chain costs is 
a significant factor.
This is why Dennis Mendoros, who is relatively optimistic about 
the resilience of the local aerospace industry, argues that ‘any 
barrier to trade is a negative influence. We cannot afford to have 
any barriers to trade… we should have a playing field in which we 
can operate freely.’49 Mendoros explained that big companies like 
Rolls Royce will be the least badly affected as they have internal 
mechanisms to protect their exposure. However, as the margins 
46 Tovey A. 2018. Rolls-Royce mulls European move as Brexit deal worries grow. The Telegraph. 23 April. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
business/2018/04/23/rolls-royce-mulls-european-move-brexit-deal-worries-grow/.  
47 Jacobs B. 2017. Rolls-Royce’s Barnoldswick plants crucial to future despite company’s record loss. The Lancashire Telegraph. 15 February. Available at: http://www.
lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/news/15093858.Rolls-Royce___s_Barnoldswick_plants_crucial_to_future_despite_company___s_record_loss/.  
48 Collis D. 2018. Shock as Rolls Royce to shed 162 jobs at local plant. Burnley Express. Available at: https://www.burnleyexpress.net/news/shock-as-rolls-royce-to-
shed-162-jobs-at-local-plant-1-9114949.  
49  Interview with Dennis Mendoros, 30 May 2018. 
are so small, a relatively hard Brexit may mean that many of the 
smaller firms in Pendle, which are reliant on contract work from 
Rolls, would suffer. 
This shows that while in the medium to long term, Pendle’s 
resilient aerospace manufacturing sector may weather the 
Brexit storm, in the short term trade exposure and supply chains 
will create operating costs. This may lead to less investment in 
improving technologies in the local manufacturing economy, 
which could stymie future growth.
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Image 7: There is near consensus that Pendle voted Leave in such high numbers due to concern over immigration
Immigration
As was outlined in a previous section, there was near 
consensus that the reason Pendle voted Leave in such high 
numbers was due to concern over immigration. While ethnic 
tensions with the Asian community were a part of this, 
so too was the perception that immigrants from Eastern 
Europe have driven down wages.50 However, this is based on 
perception more than reality. For one, it is unlikely that the 
relatively low level of European immigration in Pendle could 
have had such a significant impact on overall wage levels. 
But at a more structural level, any effect immigration could 
have had on wages is likely made up for by immigrants’ 
consumption of local goods and services, which in turn fuels 
more employment opportunities.51 Immigrants from Europe 
also pay a higher share in taxes than they are able to receive 
from any government welfare services.52 This is not to say that 
wages have not decreased and joblessness has not increased; 
however, the falls in wages began after the 2008 financial crisis 
and are tied to a slow economic recovery.53 Given that EU-born 
migrants make up just 2.1% of Pendle’s population, austerity is 
likely a more significant impact on wages and joblessness than 
immigration.54 In this area of immigration, Brexit is not likely 
to have any effect – however, if the small number of existing 
migrants were to leave the UK, this could create a small 
number of low-skilled job openings.
50 Interviews with Gordon Lishman, 31 May 2018; Tony Greaves, 25 May 2018.
51 Wadsworth et al. 2016. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Interview with Neil McInroy, 18 May 2018.
55 Interview with Miranda Barker, 28 June 2018.
56 Ibid.
57 Interview with Dennis Mendoros, 30 May 2018.
58 Ibid. 
One issue that is not often considered is that immigration has 
been an important source of skills-sharing in the aerospace 
sector. Miranda Barker detailed that there is a shortage of 
skilled engineers and a general shortage of economically 
active people in East Lancashire, some areas being at full 
employment.55 Barker also stated  that firms that have a high 
percentage of skilled European workers are concerned by what 
Brexit may mean.56 Dennis Mendoros found that immigrants 
from within and outside the EU were highly complementary 
to the success of Euravia as he said that ‘without them, we 
would not have achieved what we were able to.’57 Furthermore, 
Mendoros expressed concern that limiting cooperation with 
European universities and research centres would further 
prevent short- and long-term opportunities for skills-sharing.58 
Given Pendle’s current problems developing and retaining 
skilled workers, the likely limits on free movement of labour 
will likely exacerbate this problem. It is one thing to train local 
employees, but given the current austerity-related problems, 
immigration from the EU provides a soft sharing option that 
may not diminish. 
Uncertainty limits economic growth 
A consistent theme raised across the interviews was the 
short-term problems arising out of the uncertainty surrounding 
the current Brexit negotiations. In reiterating the resilience 
and adaptability of the manufacturing sector, Miranda Barker 
said that the most significant problem it faced regarding 
Brexit was the uncertainty and lack of reassurance or a strong 
position being provided by the government.59 Effectively, the 
inability of the UK government to provide a clear preferred 
outcome has created a more cautious business environment. 
In Pendle, small businesses account for 90% of employment. 
Andrew Leeming, the Programme Manager for Boost Business 
Lancashire, a public organisation that works with small 
business to enable their growth, says that ‘we know businesses 
are unknowing as to what life looks and feels like when we 
come to leave the EU. We can plan for change but need to start 
changing. This is creating a lack of growth.’60
What this shows then is that there is an immediate problem 
arising out of the state of the Brexit negotiations. Businesses 
that are in a more cautious mindset are not seizing current 
opportunities for growth, which in turn is preventing an injection 
of fresh investment into local communities. While this problem 
will obviously be ameliorated in the coming months as what 
Brexit entails becomes clearer, the effects of current low 
growth may be significant.
Funding local economic development 
under Brexit
As the previous section demonstrated, Pendle’s economy 
has longstanding issues in terms of skills and investment. 
While Britain’s withdrawal from the EU is not directly related to 
these problems, it is unlikely to provide short- or medium-term 
relief. This is further made clear in terms of the availability of 
European funds to facilitate local economic development. 
The 2014 – 2020 European Structural and Investment Funds 
Growth Programme (ESIF) is important for local economic 
development. It combines funding from the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF) and the 
Devolved elements of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD). These funds have been drawn on in 
Pendle. For instance, Boost Growth for Lancashire has secured 
£3.8 million until 2020.61 While this funding is complemented by 
other national and local governmental sources, it is important 
for Boost’s capacity to provide tailored business advice and 
assistance to help small and medium businesses in Lancashire 
59 Interview with Miranda Barker, 28 June 2018. 
60 Interview with Andrew Leeming, Senior Programme Manager for Boost Growth Lancashire. 
61 See https://www.boostbusinesslancashire.co.uk/case-studies/business-start-up-funding-support/. 
62 Information from internal reports provided by Boost.
63 See https://www.lancashireskillshub.co.uk/about-us/esf-overview/ 
64 Interview with Andrew Leeming. 
65 Interview with Joe Cooney, 1 June 2018.
66 Ibid. 
67 Interviews with Andrew Leeming; interview with Dennis Mendoros, 30 May 2018.
68 Deloitte. 2017. Impact of Brexit on the manufacturing industry: Aerospace & Defence. Deloitte LLP. Available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/
Documents/manufacturing/deloitte-uk-brexit-ad-sheet.pdf. 
69 Interviews with Dennis Mendoros, 30 May 2018. 
develop. For reference, from 2016-2018, Boost assisted 46 
enterprises in Pendle, which in turn helped to create 49.84 
jobs.62 Likewise, the Lancashire Skills and Employment Hub, 
receives ESF funds.63 These funds are specifically oriented 
at promoting social inclusion, sustainable employment, 
labour market mobility and skills for growth. Andrew Leeming 
acknowledged that ESIF funding is far from straightforward nor 
without its problems; however, he confirmed that it has been 
hugely important in ensuring the business assistance that Boost 
is able to provide.64 To this end, the current round of ESIF has 
been of direct assistance to the investment problems and skills 
shortages that Pendle currently faces. 
An argument can be made that in terms of local economic 
development, Brexit is unlikely to change very much. Indeed, all 
current ESIF funding is confirmed through to 2020, regardless 
of the type of Brexit that is negotiated. Councillor Joe Cooney 
argued that in terms of projects managed by Pendle Borough 
Council, the Council has stopped making applications due to 
burdensome regulatory requirements.65 Cooney also added 
that the programmatic limitations on what European funds can 
actually be used for has meant that projects that did draw on 
ERDF funds, such as the redevelopment of the Nelson town 
centre, had often been unpopular.66 
However, comments from Andrew Leeming as well as Dennis 
Mendoros, who has served on local economic development 
boards including Pendle Vision and the Lancashire 
Enterprise Partnership, emphasise the importance of ESIF 
funds.67  Furthermore, Britain’s role as a principal partner in 
the EU defence project has meant the national aerospace 
manufacturing sector has benefited from EU Defence Research 
and Development programme grants, which could be denied 
to British companies post-Brexit.68 Both Andrew Leeming and 
Dennis Mendoros expressed concern over the lack of national 
government assurances around replacing European funds.69 
Dennis Mendoros stated that, ‘for the time being we have not 
seen any indication of a firm commitment that the government 
will replace the funding with something else that has a 
meaningful substitution to the lack of tomorrow’s European 
funding.’ On top of this, local councillors have reiterated the dire 
financial position of the Pendle Borough Council, meaning it 
would be hard-pressed to contribute more than it already does.
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This report has shown that the major economic problems 
facing Pendle are a lack of financing and skills shortages. 
These are longstanding problems that in some ways 
contribute to our understanding of why people voted for 
Brexit. Unfortunately for Pendle, it seems that in the short 
term Brexit is more likely to exacerbate than solve these 
problems. However, as Neil McInroy, Chief Executive of the 
Centre for Local Economic Strategy, puts it, ‘in the absence of 
something there’s always a positive.’70 In the medium to long 
term, if Pendle follows certain policy pathways, it could make 
the most of Brexit. By way of conclusion, this section provides 
recommendations to the challenges identified in this report.
The skills shortage in Pendle appears to be the major economic 
challenge it faces. This has domestic sources in terms of the 
inability of Pendle to maintain locally-trained workers, who 
instead tend to move to Manchester or London, as well as 
difficulties surrounding the apprenticeship levy.  However, some 
firms continue to rely on European workers. Given the domestic 
sources of the skills shortage, it is unclear how businesses 
in Pendle will cover any costs associated with the loss of 
European workers. This policy problem does not appear to have 
any immediate solution. 
70 Interview with Neil McInroy, 18 May 2018.
71 Interview with Andrew Leeming; interview with Dennis Mendoros, 30 May 2018. 
However, there are more opportunities with regards to business 
financing. This report has shown that European funding 
sources have provided important support to businesses 
in Pendle. Andrew Leeming and Dennis Mendoros were 
optimistic that the national government would provide 
additional replacement funds for when access to ESIF expires 
after 2020.71 However, it is unclear exactly how the national 
government will be able to manage this within its current 
obligations and how it will change the current regulations 
behind ESIF funding. Yet, if the central government does 
provide replacement funds, then this could provide for a more 
flexible and tailored regulatory framework.
This section shows that structural funds from the EU play an important role 
in servicing the existing problems of investment and skills shortages facing 
Pendle. It is unclear how and who will supplement these funds when the 
transition from the European Union is complete.
Recommendations and Challenges Ahead
Image 8: The skills shortage in Pendle appears 
to be the major economic challenge it faces
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Noting that businesses attempt to maximise their funding 
options available from existing European funding, Leeming 
establishes that under current regulations ERDF funding comes 
with a certain caveat as ‘it takes a specific skill-set to manage 
a program that comes with the regulations that accompany 
European funding.’72 If Pendle were to diversify away from its 
economic reliance on manufacturing, retail is one sector in 
which local business could develop. However, under current 
European regulations business-to-consumer transactional 
enterprises struggle to comply with ERDF funding.73 
Traditionally, national funding programmes, like the Northern 
Powerhouse, have not had such strict regulatory measures. 
If – and this is where there is a caveat – sufficient national 
funding were to replace ERDF funding, it would provide an 
opportunity for programmes like Boost to assist a greater array 
of businesses than they are currently able. 
Secondly, as Neil McInroy emphasise, less trade with the EU 
gives potential for local enterprise to service goods and the 
desires of local people. This is a point of optimism that was 
echoed by Andrew Leeming.74 In particular, Brexit could create 
certain advantages around procurement and state aid. Under 
current EU law, national governments cannot prejudice in 
favour of local businesses or support key strategic businesses 
as it would be classified as unnecessary state intervention 
in the market. Neil McInroy argues that to this end, and with a 
relatively progressive government in power, Brexit can provide an 
opportunity for governments to more directly support locally-
oriented organisations to develop in struggling regions like 
Pendle.75
To this end, Brexit could provide an opportunity to better 
protect and diversify business in Pendle. However, this can only 
happen in the medium to long term and depends on the way 
Pendle recovers from the effect Brexit will have on Pendle’s 
longstanding economic challenges.
72 Interview with Andrew Leeming. 
73 Ibid.
74 Interviews with Dennis Mendoros, 30 May 2018; interview with 
Andrew Leeming. 
75 Interview with Neil McInroy, 18 May 2018. 
Appendix
Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Electorate in Brexit referendum Electoral Commission 223467 53400 77624 64534 158171 46500001
United 
Kingdom
Number of valid votes in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 161033 39742 56344 45335 107665 33551983
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting remain in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 62.2% 54.6% 29.1% 36.9% 46.2% 48.1%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting leave in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 37.8% 45.4% 70.9% 63.2% 53.8% 51.9%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for soft Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -1.5% -1.2% -1.4% -1.2% -1.2% -1.3%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for hard Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -2.2% -1.5% -2.0% -1.4% -1.9% -2.7%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage of live births to mothers 
not born in the UK ONS 58.7% 11.1% 17.1% 28.9% 34.8% 26.9%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage non-British ONS 20.8% 4.0% 7.6% 6.7% 19.7% 9.3% United Kingdom
Percentage non UK born ONS 39.0% 6.7% 8.6% 8.9% 22.9% 14.1% United Kingdom
Percentage born in UK, 2011 2011 Census 61.1% 94.0% 94.4% 89.1% 82.4% 86.6% England and Wales
Percentage born in other EU 
countries, 2011 2011 Census 10.4% 2.6% 3.5% 2.3% 6.7% 4.3%
England and 
Wales
Percentage white UK born APS 45.5% 92.5% 86.8% 80.4% 74.8% 79.7% United Kingdom
Percentage white not UK born APS 19.4% 4.4% 6.2% 4.7% 11.8% 6.8% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority UK born APS 17.2% 0.9% 2.0% 6.4% 3.8% 6.5% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority not UK born APS 18.0% 2.3% 5.0% 8.5% 9.6% 7.0% United Kingdom
Employment share: Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing BRES 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Mining, 
quarrying & utilities BRES 0.2% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Manufacturing BRES 2.3% 4.2% 9.8% 28.1% 3.4% 7.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Construction BRES 6.1% 5.8% 7.3% 4.7% 3.0% 4.7% Great Britain
Employment share: Motor trades BRES 1.3% 1.7% 2.4% 1.9% 1.7% 1.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Wholesale BRES 3.0% 2.0% 4.3% 3.9% 2.6% 3.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Retail BRES 11.4% 10.0% 12.2% 10.9% 9.4% 9.5% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Transport & storage (inc postal) BRES 3.0% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 6.8% 4.8% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Accommodation & food services BRES 6.8% 13.3% 6.1% 7.0% 6.8% 7.4% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Information & communication BRES 4.5% 1.3% 1.5% 3.9% 6.0% 4.1% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Financial & insurance BRES 1.9% 0.8% 1.5% 1.4% 3.0% 3.5% Great Britain
Employment share: Property BRES 4.5% 1.5% 0.9% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Professional, scientific & technical BRES 11.4% 3.3% 4.3% 3.9% 5.1% 8.7% Great Britain
Employment share: Business 
administration & support services BRES 8.3% 2.0% 12.2% 4.7% 12.0% 8.8% Great Britain
Appendix 1: Sociodemographic/voting/economy
18
Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Employment share: Public 
administration & defence BRES 3.4% 6.7% 4.3% 2.5% 4.3% 4.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Education BRES 11.4% 20.0% 8.5% 9.4% 12.0% 8.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Health BRES 15.2% 13.3% 14.6% 10.9% 17.1% 13.0% Great Britain
Employment share: Arts, entertainment, 
recreation & other services
BRES 5.3% 5.0% 4.3% 2.5% 3.8% 4.6% Great Britain
Percentage with NVQ level 4+, 
aged 16-64
APS 54.0% 31.4% 17.5% 21.5% 36.0% 38.4% United 
Kingdom
Percentage with no qualifications, 
aged 16-64
APS 5.5% 7.6% 11.2% 9.1% 7.4% 8.0% United 
Kingdom
Population, 2017 APS 389,700 74,800 105,800 89,700 250,900 65,114,500 United 
Kingdom
Social Mobility Index 
(ranking out of 324)
Social 
Mobility Index
9 Not 
available
315 144 247 Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
49.5% 11.0% 28.2% 47.2% 39.7% 36.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Labour
Electoral 
Commission
38.4% 9.7% 39.4% 34.9% 19.1% 30.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
5.5% 10.2% 25.1% 12.2% 12.8% 12.6% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
68.0% 69.0% 60.9% 68.8% 63.4% 66.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
47.1% 18.4% 46.6% 49.0% 42.8% 42.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Labour
Electoral 
Commission
45.2% 20.2% 44.5% 46.2% 47.7% 40.0% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
0.6% 1.5% 5.3% 0.0% 1.0% 1.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
70.5% 73.3% 64.5% 69.0% 67.1% 68.8% United 
Kingdom
Price level, 2016 
(regional, relative to UK index of 100)
ONS 107.2 98.1 99.6 98.8 101.5 100.0 United 
Kingdom
House price, 2017 
(mean transaction price)
Land Registry £691,914 £224,337 £148,961 £114,441 £268,534 £345,715 England and 
Wales
Notes
Employment by ethnicity data is obtained from Nomis but is not included here due to space constraints
Electoral comission data for the EU referendum is available at https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-
elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information
The Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) paper is available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit10.pdf
The ONS migration data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/datasets/
localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom
Data from the Census, Annual Population Survey (APS), and Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) are available at Noms: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/
The Social Mobility Index is only available for England
ONS regional price data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/relativeregionalconsumerpricelevelsuk/2016 
House Price data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/price-paid-data-downloads
Electoral Comission data for the 2015 and 2017 general elections is available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data/
electoral-data-files-and-reports
General election voting data is available at the parliamentary constituency level whereas this project focuses on local authorities. We impute local authority level data 
by fitting constituencies into local authorities. For Ceredigion, Mansfield and Pendle, the parliamentary constituency is equivalent to the local authority. Barnet is a 
combination of three parliamentary constituencies, namely: Finchley and Golders Green, Hendon, and Chipping Barnet. For these four local authorities there is no issue in 
obtaining local authority level general election data. Southampton is constructed of two full constituencies - Test and Itchen - and part of the constituency Romsey and 
Southampton North. To obtain general election data for Southampton, we use the population-weighted mean of the general election results for these constituencies. This 
requires us to assume that the voting behaviour of voters in the section of Romsey and Southampton North that is in the local authority Southampton is equivalent to the 
proportion that is outside of Southampton local authority. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption. Further, it only affects a 11.9% of the Southampton population, 
so any induced error is likely to be relatively very small.
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Percentage decrease in local authority 
GVA: Hard Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017)
Percentage decrease in local authority 
GVA: Soft Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017)
Appendix 2: Post Brexit percentage decrease in local authority
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